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Fourth Circuit lets Maryland keep enforcing sports-wagering laws against KalshiEX

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The US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has affirmed a Maryland district court decision that refused to block the state from enforcing its sports-wagering laws against KalshiEX. The 18 November 2026 ruling is a published affirmance of a preliminary-injunction denial, not a final judgment after a trial.

The case is KalshiEX LLC v. Martin, No. 25-1892. The published opinion was decided on 18 November 2026, after argument on 7 May 2026. The panel was Judges Gregory, Thacker and Benjamin. A short per curiam opinion, joined by Judges Gregory and Thacker, says only that the district court’s judgment is affirmed. Two concurring opinions then give different reasons for that result. Judge Benjamin dissents.

A preliminary fight, not a completed case

KalshiEX operates a prediction market on which users enter contracts with one another about whether an event will occur. The appeal concerns sporting-event contracts, such as whether a named driver will win a race or a college basketball team will win a particular game. Maryland officials had taken the position that those contracts fall under the state’s sports-wagering rules. After a cease-and-desist letter, Kalshi sued the Maryland Attorney General, the Maryland Lottery and Gaming Control Agency and related officials, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on the ground that the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) preempts Maryland’s sports-wagering laws. It also asked for a preliminary injunction.

A preliminary injunction is an order that can pause enforcement while a case proceeds. To obtain one, a plaintiff must show, among other things, a likelihood of success on the merits. The federal district court in Maryland denied that request. Having found no likelihood of success, it did not decide the remaining injunction factors. The Fourth Circuit has now affirmed that denial. The underlying lawsuit is not thereby finished, and the opinion does not itself award damages or a permanent injunction.

Two routes to the same result

The two judges who make up the majority do not share a single theory.

Judge Gregory says he does not decide whether Kalshi’s sports-event contracts are “swaps” under the CEA. Even assuming they are, he writes, neither the Act nor the Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s implementation of it clearly establishes that such contracts may trade on a designated contract market free from state gaming laws. Whether the contracts are swaps, in his view, bears on the scope of the CFTC’s authority; it does not by itself show that this authority is exclusive and displaces Maryland’s concurrent authority to regulate gambling.

Judge Thacker concurs in the judgment by a different route. She would hold that the sporting-event contracts are not swaps within the meaning of the CEA, and that they therefore lie beyond the CFTC’s exclusive regulatory authority, so Maryland officials can co-regulate them. She also cites a Ninth Circuit decision, KalshiEX, LLC v. Assad, issued on 28 August 2026.

Why Judge Gregory would not infer preemption

Judge Gregory starts from the CEA’s grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the CFTC over transactions involving swaps traded or executed on a designated contract market, 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A). He also points to a separate provision of the same Act that treats certain event contracts involving gaming, and provides that certain such contracts may not be listed or traded on a designated contract market.

Because the regulation of gambling has long been a matter of traditional state police power, he would not infer that Congress displaced Maryland’s concurrent authority without a clear expression of intent to do so. He also says Kalshi has not shown that complying with both the CEA and the Maryland law at issue would be impossible, or that Maryland’s law would stand as an obstacle to Congress’s objective of a centralised federal framework for trading derivative contracts. On that basis, he concludes that Kalshi has not demonstrated that the CEA preempts Maryland’s sports-wagering laws.

Why Judge Thacker says the contracts are not swaps

Judge Thacker treats the question as one of statutory interpretation, beginning with the text. She quotes the CEA’s definition of a “swap” in 7 U.S.C. § 1a(47)(A)(ii), and reads it as having two requirements: the contract’s payment must depend on the occurrence, non-occurrence or extent of an event or contingency, and that event or contingency must be “associated with a potential financial, economic, or commercial consequence.”

Kalshi, she says, argued that a sporting result such as the Super Bowl or the World Cup is such an event, and that the second requirement is also met. She disagrees that the contracts qualify as swaps, and she would affirm the district court on that basis. In her account, the stated purposes of the later Dodd-Frank legislation, which amended the CEA, do not give the federal government the exclusive prerogative to regulate sports betting.

The dissent and the wider split

Judge Benjamin would have gone the other way. In her view, Kalshi’s sports-related contracts qualify as swaps, Maryland’s laws are field-preempted, and Kalshi has shown a likelihood of success on the merits. She would vacate the district court’s order and remand so that the remaining preliminary-injunction factors could be considered. That is a dissent, not the judgment of the court.

The majority opinions also describe a divided landscape in other courts. The Fourth Circuit notes that, while Kalshi’s Maryland motion was pending, district courts in Nevada and New Jersey entered preliminary injunctions against those states, although the Nevada district court later reversed itself and dissolved its injunction. The opinion surveys later decisions as well, including a Third Circuit affirmance finding preemption and other district-court rulings finding none. Those citations are the Fourth Circuit’s account of other cases; they are not holdings in this appeal.

The Maryland dispute sits alongside other recent enforcement stories about markets that sit outside a state’s licensed framework, including our reports on the CFTC’s suit against Louisiana over prediction markets and on Utah’s suit alleging an illegal online casino. Those cases rest on different laws and different records, and they are not decided by this opinion.

What this ruling does not settle

The Fourth Circuit has not held, after a trial, that Kalshi’s contracts are lawful or unlawful under Maryland law. It has held that Kalshi was not entitled to a preliminary injunction on the record and arguments before the district court. Judge Gregory and Judge Thacker reached that result for different reasons, so later courts may be asked to decide which analysis, if either, controls related questions. The district-court case can still proceed, and other circuits may continue to disagree.

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