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Advocate General Maciej Szpunar told the Court of Justice of the European Union on 19 November 2026 that Italy’s blanket ban on gambling advertising is a “technical rule” whose draft had to be sent to the European Commission. His opinion also sets limits on when a missed notification would make the ban unenforceable, and it does not treat the ban as automatically incompatible with freedom of establishment.
The opinion in Case C-194/25, Leovegas Gaming plc v Autorità per le Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni, was published on EUR-Lex in a provisional edition. The original language is Polish; the official text used for this report is the French version. An advocate general’s opinion is a reasoned proposal to the Court. It is not a judgment, and the Court is not required to follow it.
The Italian case that reached Luxembourg
The dispute starts from article 9 of decreto-legge no. 87 of 12 July 2018, which, in the version that applied in the main proceedings, prohibits all forms of advertising for games of chance on any medium, including the internet. A breach of that prohibition is punishable by a fine.
Leovegas Gaming plc, a Maltese company, organises remote games of chance and collects bets in Italy under a concession from the Agenzia delle Dogane e dei Monopoli, including on a television channel on the Sky platform. On 17 October 2019, Italy’s communications authority, AGCOM, fined Leovegas €50,000 for advertising certain games of chance on that channel, in breach of the prohibition, which also covers indirect advertising, for games of chance or pari-mutuel betting for money.
Leovegas challenged the fine before the Regional Administrative Court for Lazio, which dismissed the action. It then appealed to the Consiglio di Stato, Italy’s Council of State. In that appeal, Leovegas argues that the provision is a technical rule under Directive 2015/1535 whose draft was not notified to the Commission under article 5 of the directive, and that the provision is contrary to several rules of EU law, including those on the free movement of services and freedom of establishment. The Consiglio di Stato referred questions to the Court of Justice. The request reached the Court on 11 March 2025, and a hearing was held on 1 July 2026.
A technical rule that had to be sent to the Commission
The advocate general takes the second question first. In his proposed answer, a national rule that prohibits all forms of advertising for games of chance on any medium, including the internet, is a “technical rule” under article 1(1)(f) of Directive 2015/1535, read with article 1(1)(e). The draft of such a rule is subject to the obligation to communicate it to the Commission.
He reasons that the Italian text expressly mentions, even if in veiled terms, information-society services, including “digital and telematic information channels, including social media”, and that the effect on online gambling providers was examined in the legislative process. The fact that the same ban also covers advertising by other means does not, in his view, stop it from being a rule specifically aimed at such services.
This is a legal classification, not a finding that a particular notification file is empty. Leovegas contends that the draft was not notified. Whether that factual contention is made out, and what follows from it in this case, remains for the national court once the Court of Justice has given judgment.
When a private party can rely on a missed notification
Under the Court’s case law, as the advocate general recites it, failure to communicate a draft technical rule is a substantial procedural defect, sanctioned by the inapplicability of those rules, so that they cannot be relied on against individuals. He agrees that this sanction does not depend on the objective the rule is meant to protect.
He then draws a limit. A private party may rely on a missed notification, with the result that the rule is not applicable to them, only where the rule has been or is to be applied to them because of an infringement committed in the course of that party’s provision of information-society services. If the same rule is applied because of an infringement committed in the course of providing other services, the missed notification does not, on this view, make the rule unenforceable against that person.
That limit is the practical hinge of the opinion. It means that a single advertising ban can be a technical rule, and still be enforceable in some situations even if the draft was not sent to the Commission.
When an advertisement is an information-society service
The first question asked, in essence, whether the notification rules apply when a service is provided through television broadcasting. The advocate general recasts that question as: under what conditions is advertising itself an information-society service?
His proposed answer is narrow. Advertising is an information-society service when it is communicated to a recipient in a data transmission initiated at that recipient’s individual request and addressed specifically to them. Linear communication, sent without an individual request and intended for simultaneous reception by an unlimited number of recipients, is not. Ordinary television advertising, on that test, is linear. The fact that a viewer may also have interactive television functions does not, he says, change the nature of that communication.
He leaves the classification of the communication in the main case to the Consiglio di Stato. The referring court, Leovegas and the Italian government have offered different accounts of whether the advertising at issue was a distinct, non-interactive television service or part of an interactive remote-gambling service. The opinion does not choose among those accounts.
Freedom of establishment does not automatically condemn the ban
The fourth question concerns compatibility with EU law more generally. The advocate general considers that article 49 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, on freedom of establishment, is the relevant freedom here, because Leovegas, established in Malta, acquired part of an Italian business in 2017 with a concession for organising remote games, which implies a stable and continuous participation in the host state’s economy.
A total advertising ban, he accepts, is capable of restricting that freedom, because it limits the ability of a firm to make itself known to potential customers. Such a restriction may be justified if it pursues an overriding reason of general interest and is proportionate. The referring court has identified the aim as combating the abusive use of this form of entertainment and addiction to it, and thereby preventing serious socio-economic consequences.
Given the wide discretion member states have in regulating games of chance, the advocate general finds it difficult not to agree with the Commission that a ban on advertising that promotes such services, while reducing incentives in public space, is capable of achieving that aim, and that it is not established that the ban goes beyond what is necessary. A total ban is not, in itself, contrary to legal certainty or legitimate expectations; whether the way this ban was introduced respected those principles is for the national court, after examining matters such as the content of Leovegas’s concession and how the rules were adopted and brought into force.
His proposed answer on this point is that article 49 TFEU does not preclude a national rule banning all forms of gambling advertising on any medium, provided the rule does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve its objective and is implemented with respect for legal certainty and the legitimate expectations of those concerned.
An opinion, not a judgment
The Court of Justice still has to give judgment. Until it does, the Consiglio di Stato has not received a binding answer, and the 2019 fine has not been finally disposed of by this opinion. The questions here are also different from recent policy debates about advertising bans in other countries, including the UK government’s reply to the House of Lords and Bulgaria’s cabinet decision to back a gambling advertising ban. Those are political choices. This opinion is about notification, enforceability and Treaty freedoms in a pending Italian case. Spain’s recent notification to the EU of a draft risk-detection mechanism illustrates the same family of EU information procedures, but it concerns a different draft and a different member state.
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